Nocebo effects occur when an individual experiences undesirable physiological reactions caused by doxastic states that are not a treatment’s core or characteristic features.1 As Scott Gelfand2 points out, there are numerous studies that have shown that the disclosure of a treatment’s side effects to a patient increases the risk of the side effects. From an ethical point of view, nocebo effects caused by the disclosures of side effects present a challenging problem. On the one hand, clinicians’ duty to inform patients (...) of the consequences (including possible side effects) of their treatments is critical in ensuring that patients’ autonomy is respected. Patients cannot act autonomously if relevant information is withheld from them (without their consent, perhaps). On the other hand, clinicians also ought to minimize harm to patients. (shrink)

In recent times Wittgenstein's work in logic has had an influence on other branches of philosophy. I am thinking, in particular, of social philosophy and the philosophy of religion. In these branches, Wittgenstein's followers have made much use of his notion of a language game. It has been argued, for example, that religion forms a language game of its own, having its own standards of reason, and is therefore not subject to criticism from outside. This argument has given rise to (...) controversy, some seeing it as a subtle attempt by the religious to evade criticism. I have come myself to feel that the notion of a language game has been put to uses with which Wittgenstein himself might not have agreed, or, if he had, would have been wrong to do so. In order to explain what I mean I should like to look closely at the opening section of Peter Winch's article ‘Understanding a Primitive Society’. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A number of philosophers have argued that alcoholics should receive lower priority for liver transplantations because they are morally responsible for their medical conditions. In this paper, I argue that this conclusion is false. Moral responsibility should not be used as a criterion for the allocation of medical resources. The reason I advance goes further than the technical problem of assessing moral responsibility. The deeper problem is that using moral responsibility as an allocation criterion undermines the functioning of medicine.

We are dealing with the Dirac Hamiltonian H = H0 + V with no magnetic field and radially symmetric electrostatic potential V = V(r), preferably the Coulomb potential. While the observable H is precisely predictable, its components H0 (relativistic mass) and V (potential energy) are not. However they both possess precisely predictable approximations H0 ∼ and V∼ which approximate accurately if the particle is not near its nucleus. On the other hand, near 0, H0 and V are practically unpredictable, perhaps (...) in agreement with the fact, that a neutrino also should be in the game. [We have not yet studied the corresponding observables for the (≥ 12-dimensional) problem of electro-weak interaction.] Mathematically we are focusing on the spectral theory of the unbounded self-adjoint operators H0 ∼ and V ∼. We can prove that V ∼ is unitarily equivalent to V(r) again, by a unitary map given as Wiener-Hopf-type singular integral operator in the standard separation of variables for radially symmetric Dirac Hamiltonians. [This is, as far as the continuous spectrum is concerned.] Very similar unitary equivalence holds for H 0 ∼ and H 0. We are tempted to regard this as a form of “renormalization”. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article:F.H. Bradley, Collected Works Volumes 1–5.

Evidence for the association of ‘soluble’ enzymes in vivo is extensive and compelling. These associations occur in all compartments of the cell of both prokaryotes and eukaryotes. Several factors present in vivo promote these associations among enzymes whose association in vitro is often too weak to detect. Several physiological advantages of the associated enzyme complexes can be identified, most (but not all) of which are the consequence of microcompartmentation of metabolites (substrate channeling). Substrate channeling of intermediates by either a ‘direct (...) transfer’ process or ‘proximity effects’ can occur. The latter mechanism does not require the special molecular features needed for the direct transfer mechanism and may, therefore, exist in more general situations in the cell. Criticisms of these views are discussed. We argue that these criticisms have been largely answered by experiment and theory in recent years. Studies on simple systems in vitro, nevertheless, contribute important insights concerning the more complex phenomena in vivo. (shrink)

Hume is not a philosopher who has been viewed, on the whole, with excessive sympathy. Slips and inadequacies of argument, which are the inevitable consequence of human fallibility, are treated by his critics not with charity but with delight; and there are few who think it necessary to state his argument at its strongest before proceeding to refute it. A striking example of this procedure may be found in Antony Flew's paper ‘Another Idea of Necessary Connection’. The example is striking (...) because Flew is normally one of the most sympathetic of Hume's critics and he might have been expected, in dealing with Humes view of causal necessity, to have proceeded with exceptional fairness, the incidental being identified and discarded and the essential view standing forth at its strongest. This, as I shall show, is not what occurs; but first let us consider what we are to take the essential view to be. (shrink)

Metaphysics -- Bacon -- Locke -- Kant -- Comte -- Logical positivism -- Russell -- Analysis -- Quine and science -- Wittgenstein.

The first part of this paper deals with Mill’s influential criticism of the natural law tradition. According to Mill, this tradition is based on a mistaken conception of nature. This essay argues that Mill’s own view of nature is misconceived and that this misconception leads him to misrepresent the tradition itself. The second part deals with those modern philosophers who reject the natural law tradition but who nevertheless attempt to account for morality as being based on human nature. Certain criticisms (...) are made of their views. The chief criticism is that their views are based on an idea of nature that is no different from Mill’s. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's view of philosophy in the Tractatus presupposes that thought may be revealed without remainder in the use of signs. It is commonly held, however, that in the Tractatus he treated thought as logically prior to language. If this view, expressed most lucidly by Norman Malcolm, were correct, Wittgenstein would be inconsistent in holding that thought can be revealed without remainder in the use of signs. I argue that this is not correct. Thought may be prior to language in time (...) but not in logic, for non-verbal symbols must have a logical structure in common with verbal ones. A view comparable with Malcolm's holds that Wittgenstein, under the influence of Schopenhauer, is committed to some form of solipsism. I argue that neither Schopenhauer nor Wittgenstein held any version of solipsism. For both philosophers, subject and object are correlative, so that it is incoherent to affirm the existence of the one without presupposing the existence of the other. (shrink)

Sophie Botros's criticism of my review depends in part on certain misprints which appear in the review as printed. In particular, words are omitted from my summary of her position. What I wrote was as follows.